

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

PREFACE

INTRODUCTION

I. HUMAN SOURCES Assessment Overview

- | | |
|-----------------------|------------------|
| - Espionage | Legal presence |
| - Technology Transfer | Illegals |
| - Legal and illegal | Visitors |
| - Clandestine | Overt collection |
| | Recruitments/ |
| | penetrations |

a) THREAT EVALUATION IN CONUS:

1. Soviet/Warsaw Pact
2. Cuba
3. PRC
4. Vietnam/N. Korea
5. Other countries

b) THREAT EVALUATION OVERSEAS:

1. Soviet/Warsaw Pact
2. Cuba
3. PRC
4. Vietnam/N. Korea
5. Other countries

c) INTERRELATIONSHIP OF HOSTILE COUNTRIES

d) U.S. OBJECTIVES

e) U.S. CAPABILITIES

1. Detection, collection, investigation
2. Analysis, assessment
3. Countering
4. Existing and programmed countermeasures
5. Coordination between US agencies
6. Information (ANNEX) document, physical, personnel, communication, computer, industrial security

f) DEFICIENCIES

1. Perceived shortfalls
2. Legal, procedural, resource-impacting policy limitations
3. Free vs closed society

g) RESOURCE CONSIDERATIONS

1. Current
2. Projected 1985 to 1990 needs

II. SIGINT Assessment Overview

- Satellites
- Ships - AGIs
 - Merchant Ships
 - Submarines
- Aircraft - Standoff
 - Civil Overflights
- Legal establishments
- Land bridges

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Include operational component countermeasures, specifying why and how and the effect.

III. IMAGERY Assessment Overview

- Satellites
- Merchant ships
- Aircraft

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IV. ACOUSTIC INTELLIGENCE Assessment Overview

- Ships
- Aircraft
- Sensors

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V. ACTIVE MEASURES Assessment Overview

a) THREAT EVALUATION IN CONUS:

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Deal with aspects of media manipulation, front organizations, agents of influence, and the like.

SECRET

GUIDANCE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY DIRECTIVE 2/82
ON "DETECTING AND COUNTERING THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE THREAT
TO THE UNITED STATES"

by Study
DIRECTOR

- + o An Executive Summary of no more than a dozen pages will be prepared.
- + o A supporting paper of greater detail but limited to manageable length.
- o The threat capabilities and deficiencies assessments should be drawn to the extent feasible from previously prepared studies and submitted in summary form in order that the emphasis can be placed on the sufficiency of U.S. countermeasures and what added resources are needed.
- o To minimize redundancy, discussions should be separate for each discipline and include only the most significant aspects of the threat within that discipline. The USSR and the PRC are to be treated individually; other countries or blocs can be cited as is deemed appropriate, i.e., Warsaw Pact, Communist Bloc Asia, Cuba, "friendlies," etc.
- o For all disciplines, the key hostile intelligence services targets are to be cited and a summary judgment made as to the state of U.S. capabilities to protect these targets.
- o The Human Sources discipline is to consider such key aspects as the legal presence, illegals, visitors, overt collection, recruitments/penetrations, etc.
- o Countermeasures against SIGINT, Imagery and Acoustic Intelligence threats are to include operational component countermeasures, specifying why and how and the effect.
- o The Active Measures discipline is to deal with aspects of media manipulation, front organizations, agents of influence, and the like.
- o Projected resource needs are to be detailed and specific in terms of manpower and funding and phase-in periods. Anticipated results should be related to projected requirements.